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In a 2015 post on the London Review of Books Blog Glen Newey regaled 
us with a rich morsel of autobiography: 
 
In the early 1960s, the British state, having decided people 
could go to hell in their own way, legalised both suicide and 
off-course betting. Newly legal high-street bookies like my 
father, poshed up into ‘turf accountants’, still had to do 
their business behind frosted glass, lest passers-by be 
corrupted by glimpses of the depravities within. In a school-
gate encounter with my mother, a fellow parent, Mr Crapp 
– a pillar of the local chartered accountants’ guild and man 
of God – voiced his surprise that she had the brass to show 
herself in public, given her husband’s job. My doubts about 
moralism surfaced around this time. Later, the parallel 
realisation dawned that bankers, mortgage lenders, 
insurers, even Mr Crapp – the plaster saints of market 
society – had feet of clay. (Newey 2015, emphasis added.) 
 
 Anyone familiar with Glen Newey and his academic work will 
read the sentence I italicised as an instance of characteristically self-
effacing irony, as its author went on to become one of the most 
prominent realist critics of the still dominant but now somewhat 
embattled ”ethics first” approach in Anglophone political philosophy. In 
this brief piece I would like to point out an additional, related layer of 
meaning, namely that of a hyperbole. I suggest, that is, that Newey did 
entertain serious worries about political moralism long before those 
became common currency in our discipline. That is to say, Newey’s work 
from the late 1990s and early 2000s anticipated many of the themes that 
were to become the centrepieces of the revival of political realism 
prompted by the reception of work of Raymond Geuss and Bernard 
Williams published in the mid-to-late 2000s (Geuss 2008, Williams 2005).  
 In what follows I will first try to trace some key realist themes in 
Newey’s work, to try and show how his realist insights preceded the 
explicit realist revival, and how they then developed in dialogue with the 
growing realist literature. I will then try to place Newey in a taxonomy of 
realisms, to the extent that his often illuminatingly contrarian positions 
allows for such an exercise. Finally, and more speculatively, I will 
consider some of Newey’s posthumous work, to try and see where his 
unique approach to realism might take us next. 
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The 2001 monograph After Politics is undoubtedly the largest piece of 
evidence of Newey’s prescient realism, though as I will try to show it is 
by no means the earliest. Its central idea is indeed one that we now, in 
hindsight, easily associate with the realist revival. It is the idea that, for 
all the fanfare saluting the Rawls-induced resurrection of normative 
political theory in the second half of the 20th century, the revived subfield 
was too far removed from its ostensible subject matter to warrant its 
name. “Reports of the discipline’s survival may have been exaggerated”, 
Newey warns, because “few works of modern liberal political philosophy 
attempt to address the real world of politics, often applying 
inappropriate theoretical models to it when they do” (Newey, 2001 xxx). 
As I noted, this is by now a familiar realist methodological complaint,, 
though one Newey pairs with a more substantive claim aiming to show 
that the mainstream approach is also politically flawed, in the sense that 
it hides an attempted power-grab that seeks to re-centre politics around 
liberal priorities: “liberal political philosophers aim at the supersession 
of the 
ostensible subject-matter of their discipline – that is, politics; they 
aim at a post-political order” (Newey 2001: 1-2).  I trust that this brief 
summary shows why I think it is fair to say that After Politics was, in many 
ways, ahead of its time.   
 What is more, I think those original contributions had 
blossomed much earlier, as far back as some of Newey’s first 
publications, dating from the mid-nineties. Newey’s early research topics 
were fairly typical for an analytically-trained British philosopher: his first 
articles concern the justifiability of political authority in the face of value 
pluralism. However, the perspective Newey brought to bear on this topic 
is far from commonplace, and reveals a realist position in the making. 
For example, in an early piece on liberal approaches to multiculturalism, 
Newey skewers a typical post-Rawlsian liberal position with a realist 
move: “Clashes of interest inevitably demand the exercise of power, 
however bien pensant--or chary of giving offence--those wielding it.” 
(Newey 1996: 215) That is to say, political philosophers should not 
delude themselves that they can make political problems evaporate if 
only they can find the perfect mixture of pre-political moral 
commitments. Relatedly, in an article on political obligation from the 
same period, we find a sober conclusion that would resonate with some 
current realist views on legitimacy, especially of what I would call the 
‘ordorealist’ variety, as we will see shortly: “A raison d’etat justification 
of state action, making no mention of citizens’ obligations, may be the 
most we can hope for” (Newey 1996b: 23).  
 
III 
The examples above illustrate the long-running realist thread in Newey’s 
thought, and how it informed the argument of After Politics.2 Given this 
 
2 Similar observations could be made about the relationship between 
these realist insights and Newey’s work on toleration (e.g. 2001, 2013; 
Galeotti 2019, Liveriero 2019) and on Hobbes (e.g. 2008): both of those 
bodies of work are characterized by a reckoning with the idea that all too 
often political problems do not admit of philosophical solutions that 
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long gestation, it is perhaps unsurprising that Newey became one of the 
most prominent and insightful exponents of the realist revival in 
contemporary Anglophone political philosophy, once the revival was 
conceptualized as such. What, then, is Newey’s place in the emerging 
realist current?  
As I argued at length elsewhere (Rossi 2019), I think it is possible 
and fruitful to distinguish between three main realist approaches, at 
least insofar as we take them as Weberian ideal types: ordorealism, 
contextual realism, and radical realism. While all three realist 
approaches reject the priority of even any role for pre-political moral 
commitments in normative political theory, they are in principle distinct, 
so while there is some overlap between them it is useful to think of them 
as ways of centering three different non-moralistic problems: the need 
for order and stability in the case of ordorealism, the question of the 
appropriate scope of political power for contextual realism, and the 
intertwining of power and knowledge for radical realism. Each approach, 
then, draws its political normativity from different sources. 
Ordorealism leverages a distinction between politics and raw 
domination, or suspended warfare, to characterize the question of peace 
and security—the “first political question” in Williams’s parlance—
polities should prioritize (see e.g. Sleat 2013). The idea here is that, while 
security and peace are paramount, might is not right, because a kind of 
peace that is merely the product of raw domination does not count as an 
instance of a political relationship. The crucial difference between this 
approach and a moralist one lies in the fact that the normative work is 
done by a conceptual distinction between politics and suspended 
warfare, and not by a moral entitlement to a certain standard of 
treatment. A government that treats its subjects like the Spartans 
treated the Helots—to use Williams’s example—is simply not a 
government but an enemy. And choosing whether to be a government 
or an enemy is outside of the scope of the theory of legitimacy.  
Contextual realism adopts a more practice-dependent 
(Sangiovanni 2008) understanding of what it means to answer the first 
political question. This type of realism draws its normativity from an 
interpretation of the point and purpose of the institutions that answer 
the first political question. Such an approach allows for a wider set of 
normative considerations to influence an order’s legitimacy, including, in 
some contexts, many issues not typically considered part of the purview 
of peace and security (e.g. distributive equality and welfare – see Jubb 
2015).  
Radical realism’s main focus is on providing empirically-driven 
genealogies—both debunking and vindicatory—of the legitimating 
ideologies of practices, institutions, and even whole polities. Crudely, 
political realities and possibilities are often not as they seem. Both 
existing political orders and possible alternatives are often accepted or 
discarded for power-distorted reasons, which in turn is an epistemic 
flaw, in the sense that it sabotages our pursuit of the truth. Radical 
realism’s normativity, then, is epistemic, as it seeks to ground critique 
not on moral grievances but on improving our understanding of how the 
world works (see Prinz & Rossi 2017, Rossi 2019, Rossi & Argenton 
forthcoming).  
 
preserve all that is of value, let alone plausibly subordinate matters of 
power and interest to matters of morality (Rossi 2013).  
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With that taxonomy in place, I would tentatively suggest that 
Newey’s realism evolved from a roughly ordorealist stance to a more 
contextual one, and that, despite his skepticism of the genealogical 
Ideologiekritik found in the radical approach, his most recent work may 
yield new insights for realists interested in ideology critique. The work 
on multiculturalism and political obligation highlighted above shows the 
clearest indication of the ordorealist leanings of Newey’s early work. 
Already in After Politics and in some work on toleration from the same 
period, however, we begin to see a shift away from harsh Realpolitik or 
raison d’etat, and towards a more inclusive account of political 
normativity.3 The position now seems to be centred on a distinction 
between the misguided search of a harmonious moral resolution of 
political problems, and a context-sensitive account of political 
accommodation, which isn’t a mere watering-down of political morality, 
but rather a search for what we would now call a distinctly political 
normativity grounded in an understanding of, e.g., the practice of 
democratic decision-making (Newey 2001a, 2001b).  
Newey then took up the issue of political normativity more 
explicitly in some more recent and—by now—more self-consciously 
realist work. For instance, in his contribution to the 2010 special issue of 
the European Journal of Political Theory that for many represents a sort 
of semi-official launch of the realist current, Newey argued for an 
avowedly anti-moralist and contextualist understanding of the type of 
normativity that can legitimate political orders: his realist approach  
 
… does not attempt to establish a pre-existing order of 
reasons by reference to which legitimacy is to be 
understood. Reasons for acting politically, which include the 
understandings on which perceptions of legitimacy rest, are 
as much part of the local political culture as are, say, political 
institutions. This dims the prospects for theories which seek 
to lay down foundations for politics using reasons with 
purportedly universal domain. There is however no special 
reason to greet the specificity of political reasons with 
dismay. (Newey 2010: 450) 
 
So Newey’s earlier realist account of politics, which, given its 
focus on raison d’etat, one might have considered more universalistic, 
gave way to a more contextual, even “relativist” (ibid.: 462-3) position. 
This reading of the position also allows us to see how, despite his 
skepticism about liberal moralism, Newey can still be considered a liberal 
(Morgan 2020), albeit a disillusioned, almost reticent liberal (hence his 
doubts on the more radical wing of realism, as we will see in the next 
section). Newey’s message is indeed that liberalism doesn’t have to be 
the pious moralistic enterprise it has become in the dominant Anglo-
American tradition. Newey’s rather contributes to alternative and 
certainly no less storied liberal tradition, or family of traditions. The first 
liberal lineage that comes to mind here isthe “liberalism of fear” 
commonly associated with political realism (Shklar 1989), a variant of 
 
3 Not that Newey was ever a fully-fledged ordorealist, even of the liberal 
variety. He didn’t quire offer a realpolitik-motivated endorsement of 
liberalism as much as sort of diagnostic resignation to its structures and 
strictures. 
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which Newey investigated directly, especially through his work on John 
Gray’s political thought (Horton & Newey 2007). Looking further back, it 
doesn’t seem too far-fetched to also associate Newey to the 
longstanding Italian realist tradition. This tradition has its roots in 
Machiavelli and Guicciardini, flourishes in the Enlightenment era, and 
carries on through the 20th century in both socialist and liberal variants. 
I bring up this Italian tradition because I would like to suggest that it is 
possible, albeit speculatively, to associate Newey’s reluctant liberalism 
with the strand of political thought that runs from Machiavelli’s ragion 
di stato all the way to Benedetto Croce’s subdued Hegelian Liberalism—
a liberalism that, somewhat like Newey’s, may be considered realist to 
the extent that it is built on a historical situatedness that, however, 
resists the temptation of teleological moralism (Bellamy 2013: 184). 
 
IV 
Let me now move on to some even more speculative thoughts about 
where Newey’s thinking on realism might have been headed, and where 
it may lead us. I mentioned that he is sceptical of ideology critique, and 
so by extension would have been sceptical of radical realism. We can see 
this in the 2010 piece already: “Does it matter that power-relations 
influence a person’s normative beliefs? […] Attempts to free people by 
relieving them of dubiously acquired normative beliefs will have familiar 
perverse effects.” (Ibid. 2010: 461).  
A 2016 paper extends that line of thought. Though sadly 
posthumous, this piece displays Newey’s characteristically contrarian 
ability to insightfully read arguments against themselves. By developing 
the notion of a “power loop”, Newey criticises Bernard Williams’s Critical 
Theory Principle—the idea that we can and should isolate ruling power-
distorted elements in a political order’s legitimation story—and even the 
very distinction between politics and suspended warfare. The idea is of 
a power loop is indeed that of the “ineliminability of the effect of force 
on how the political context of justification is understood” (Newey 2016). 
That is to say, whether we judge whether the first political question has 
been answered satisfactorily cannot be independent of the coercion that 
has partly shaped our way of conceptualizing our political predicament. 
This is a radicalization of Williams’s (and Geuss’s) critical-theoretic 
approach: Newey’s idea is that, taken to its natural conclusion, ideology 
critique ends up proving too much, in a way that is reminiscent of 
moralistic approaches to legitimacy: “if the issue is fought out on the 
moralist’s ground, anarchists are likely to have the better of it. The 
problem with anarchism is that it is not a political position – or at least, 
not unless it answers the basic political question, What do we do?” 
(2016: 12). The conclusion Newey seems to want to draw from this is, 
crudely, that we should abandon the project of ideology critique and 
reconcile ourselves to the strictures of existing state-based solutions to 
the problem of legitimacy. But is that the only possible result of that 
argument?  
To conclude this brief essay I would like to sketch a Neweyan 
move against Newey, and read his argument against his own position 
and extend it in the service of radical realism. To do so, let us take a step 
back and look at the background to this view, namely Newey’s “naturalist 
account of politics”, based on the “broadly Aristotelian insight” that 
“political decisions are typically a bricolage created from found objects” 
(2013: location 784). It seems to me that that approach raises the 
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question of how old those found objects should be. Why start from the 
state? A political naturalist approach should start from the idea of the 
inevitability of coercive structures, but there is no need to start from 
currently existing coercive structures. Indeed, a look at the 
anthropological and archaeological evidence rather suggests that, for 
over 90% of human history, the “natural” type of polity was that of an 
acephalous order enforced through horizontal, non-centralised coercion 
(see Widerquist & McCall 2017 for an excellent survey of the evidence). 
Insofar as those societies were stateless, they would satisfy the 
desiderata of most contemporary anarchists, including realist ones (e.g. 
Brinn 2019). Newey is only partly right to claim that anarchism is a form 
of moralism (2016): it is only insofar as it rejects politics and/or the 
coercion that goes with it, but empirical evidence shows that that 
anarchism doesn’t need to do that. In fact I haven’t shown it, but merely 
pointed at the anarchism displayed by the overwhelming majority of 
human history. The key element that characterizes anarchism on this 
account is not the rejection of politics but the rejection of the state with 
its sovereign prerogatives (Raekstad 2016). Newey was right to say that 
liberal moralist consent-based realist theories lead to (moralistic) 
philosophical anarchism. But an empirically-grounded form of radical 
realism may just be able to offer a debunking genealogy of the statism 
implicit in mainstream theories of legitimacy, and a vindicatory 
genealogy of anarchist political structures (for a similar argument, see 
Rossi & Argenton forthcoming). Newey might then still have asked 
whether this form of anarchism can answer the question of what to do. 
I happen to think that realists can demand the impossible, and that 
prefigurative politics could provide a pathway towards radically 
transformative political projects (Rossi 2019), so I don’t find the question 
troubling, at least in the form in which I, reading Newey’s work, am able 
to pose it. What I do find troubling and dejecting is that Glen Newey is 
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